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TRYING TO PUSH A SQUARE PEG THROUGH A ROUND HOLE:
WHY THE HIGHER EDUCATION STYLE OF STRICT SCRUTINY
REVIEW DOES NOT FIT WHEN COURTS CONSIDER K-12
ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS
]ames Nial Robinson II*
Our doubts are traitors, and makes us lose the good we oft might
win, by fearing to attempt. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

With affirmative action programs at institutions of higher education
seemingly lying on their collective deathbeds, 2 the Supreme Court, long
silent on the issue of race-based admissions programs at the university
leveV issued its rulings on the highly publicized University of Michigan
cases. 4 While representing a mixed bag, the rulings appear to breathe
' Attorney with White & Case L.L.P. (Miami office). J.D., University of Florida Frederic G. Levin
College of Law; B.S., Florida Gulf Coast University. I would like to thank Professor joseph S. jackson
for introducing me to this subject. I would also like to thank my wife, LaTeshia, and our son,
Christian Michael, whose combined patience and support made this article possible. The views
reflected in this Article are those of the author only, and not of White & Case or its clients.
I. William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, l.iv.78-80 (Brian Gibbons ed., Cambridge U.
Press 1991 ).
2. A recent decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, striking down as
unconstitutional the admissions program employed by the University of Georgia, was typical of
circuit court decisions wherein race-based admissions programs were discussed, dismantled, and
then discarded. See e.g. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1254 (11th Cir.
2001) (holding that the undergraduate admissions program at the University of Georgia that
considered race was unconstitutional).
3. The last case wherein the Supreme Court considered the use of race-based admissions
programs at the collegiate level until the recent University of Michigan cases, see infra n. 4, was
Regents of the U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) [hereinafter Bakke].
4. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003) (holding that the University of
Michigan Law School's race-based admissions program was constitutional); see also Gratz v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2430 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan's undergraduate
admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause). Commenting on the importance of the
two University of Michigan cases against the Bakke backdrop, Ted Shaw, associate counsel of the
NAACP, offered the following: "These represent the most significant civil right cases the Supreme
Court will have decided in the last quarter century .... This issue is nothing less than whether the
doors of opportunity remain open for students of color." William Mears, CNN.com Law Center,
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some new life into a program that some saw as having reached the end of
its line, 5 with the Court specifically holding that diversity can be a
compelling governmental interest. 6 Thus, institutions of higher learning
may consider the race of their applicants as the institutions seek to attract
and enroll a racially diverse student body. 7
The High Court's ruling will undoubtedly have wide-reaching effects
on colleges and universities as they scramble to restructure evaluative
processes that took years to create, assess, review, and revise. However,
institutions of higher education are not the only places of learning that
will be affected by the Supreme Court's decision. While a wide body of
literature has addressed the use of race-based admissions programs in
higher education, 8 little attention has been paid to another set of
admissions programs that the Court's decision will also affect: race-based
admissions programs in K-12 public schools. Such programs primarily
exist in the context of "non-traditional" schools such as magnet schools,
charter schools and school transfer programs,Y wherein students typically
compete for a limited number of seats.
Cases challenging race-based admissions programs in K-12 schools
are intriguing for several reasons. First, the use of such programs in
school districts is on the rise, 10 making relevant law increasingly pertinent
Affirmative Action Case Awaits Supreme Court Review, <http://www.cnn.com/2002/LA W /12/02/
scotus.affirmative.action/> (Oct. 31, 2003).

5. For example, on Nov. 9, 1999, before any court in Florida ruled on the constitutionality of
the matter, Governor )eb Bush officially ended affirmative action in Florida colleges and universities
with his announcement of the "One Florida" initiative. The stated goal of this program is
"increase[d] opportunity and diversity in the state's universities and in state contracting without
using policies that discriminate or that pit one racial group against another." State of Florida, One
Florida Initiative <http://www.oneflorida.org> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003).
The plan seeks to
accomplish this goal "without race-based admissions practices." State of Florida, <http://www.
oneflorida.org/myflorida/government/governorinitiatives/one_florida/announcements.html>.
6. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2329.
7. !d.
8. See e.g. Ross I. Booher, Student Author, Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause-Racial Preferences in College and University Admissions, 64 Tenn. L. Rev.
497 (1997); Jennifer C. Brooks, Student Author, The Demise of Aj)irmative Action and the Ej)ect on
Higher Education Admissions: A Chilling fjfect or Much Ado about Nothing?, 48 Drake L. Rev. 567
(2000); Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87 Gen. L.]. 981
(1999); Leland Ware, Tales from the Crypt: Does Strict Scrutiny Sound the Death Knell for Affirmative
Action in Higher Education?, 23 ).C. & U.L. 43 (1996).
9. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 791 (1st Cir. 1998); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit C.
Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 2000); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., !95 F.3d 698, 702
(4th Cir. 1999); Hunterv. Regents of the U. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061,1062 (9th Cir. 1999).
10. See e.g. Catherine Gewertz, Dayton Feels the Heat From Charter Schools, 21 Educ. Week I
(Apr. 24, 2002) (available at <http://www.edwcck.org/ew/ew_printstory.cfm?slug=32dayton.h21>
(accessed Oct. 23, 2003)) (documenting that the number of charter schools is on the rise, with nearly
2,400 schools enrolling 580,000 students nationwide). The U.S. Department of Education reports
that the number of magnet schools has tripled in the last decade. See Mid-Atlantic Equity
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and pervasive. Second, there is a division among the Circuits as to how
courts should rule on race-based admissions programs in the K-12
setting. Some courts have applied strict scrutiny review when ruling on
K-12 admissions programs in much the same manner that these courts
review affirmative action programs in higher education. On the other
hand, other courts distinguish between the K-12 and higher education
programs and attempt to tailor their analysis accordingly. Third, an
intriguing aspect not present in litigation over higher education
admissions programs is that admissions standards that take race into
account in the K-12 setting likely do so to further integration. This effort
started some 30 years ago by order of the United States Supreme
Court 11 -and is today meeting serious resistance across the country. 12
The end result is a tension between Supreme Court precedent and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This article will first provide background cases that highlight how the
consideration of race has been part of K-12 public school systems since
the abolition of slavery. It will then outline four recent cases that deal
with the consideration of race as part of admissions criteria in K-12
public schools. Finally, in light of these recent decisions and the history
of this body of law, this article will conclude that courts should employ a
relaxed form of scrutiny when reviewing K-12 admissions programs that
consider race as part of its assessment of candidates. Indeed, courts
should give broad deference to school districts and allow them to
consider race as they seek to reduce de facto segregation and racial
isolation, and further promote integration.
II.

CONSIDERATION OF RACE HISTORICALLY

A.

The Reconstruction Era

The "Reconstruction Era," which began soon after the abolition of
slavery in the United States, heralded several legislative advances that
secured the civil rights of African- Americans. 13 Chief among this
legislation were the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. 14 Of course, there was great debate
Comortiurn, MAEC, Magnet Schools <http://www.maec.org/mag-schl.html> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003).
11. Brown v. /3d. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), ajfd, 349 U.S. 291, 301 (1955) (holding
that segregalion in public school systems was unconstitutional).
12. See Glenn C. Loury, Integration Has Had Its Day, N.Y. Times Op-Ed (Apr. 23, 1997)
(noting the courts' relaxing of earlier decrees mandating integration).
13. juan 1'. Perea, Richard Delgado, Angela P. Harris & Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and
Races: Cases and Resources j(Jr a Diverse America 131-32 (Jean Stefancic, ed., West 2000).
14. /d. at 132-33.
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about the scope of the new laws, and many resisted any real degree of
equality between the black and white races. 15 The clamor soon reached
the Supreme Court of the United States, which set forth the "proper"
application of these Reconstruction Amendments. Unfortunately for
African-Americans and other racial minorities, however, proper application
usually meant limited application of these Amendments, particularly in
cases involving violations of the civil rights of African Americans. 16
B.

Plessy v. Ferguson

In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court had occasion to hear
arguments regarding the constitutionality of a statute that the legislature
had passed in the state of Louisiana. 17 This statute provided the following:
[A]ll railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this
state, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white,
and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each
passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so
as to secure separate accommodations: provided, that this section shall
not be construed to apply to street railroads. No person or persons shall
be permitted to occupy seats in coaches, other than the ones assigned to
them, on account of the race they belong to. 1x

The facts that brought this case to trial involved Plessy, a man of
mixed heritage, who was told to leave the white section of a train and
move to the section designated for African Americans. 19 Plessy refused,
was hauled off to jail, and was later convicted of violating this criminal
statute. 20 He subsequently challenged the statute on constitutional
15. Id. at 140-41.
16. See e.g. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 68-73, 80-81 (1872). The Supreme Court
interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so narrowly as to
render it completely ineffective in the protection of the civil rights of the freedmen. See Perea et al.
supra n. 13, at 133. For constitutional purposes, this clause has been nullified and lies dormant. Td.
Interestingly, the legislative history from the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that it was meant to
be a very broad protection of natural law rights. See Con g. Globe, 39th Con g., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866),
wherein Rep. Bingham argued that the Amendment should "protect by national law the privileges
and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within the
jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State."
Id. It is obvious that the Amendment was meant to apply to a much broader category of cases than
was decided by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases. See also Pamela Brandwein,
Reconstructing Reconstruction: The Supreme Court and the Production of Historical Truth ch. 4 (Duke
U. Press 1999) (criticizing the Supreme Court for not giving a much broader meaning to the Civil
War and the post-War amendments).
17. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896), overruled, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483,494-95 (1954).
18. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540 (emphasis added).
19. ld. at 541-42. Plessy was ordered to vacate his seat in the white section by the Conductor.
20. ld. Plessy was forcibly ejected from the train with the assistance of a police officer, and
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grounds. 21 The Supreme Court of Louisiana eventually upheld the
statute. 22 Plessy then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. 23
What resulted was the ratification of the so-called "separate but
equal" doctrine. 24 In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated that a proper
review of the statute required an analysis of its reasonableness,
determined by the traditions and customs of that area. 25 Thus, in
essence, the Court upheld this legislation because it ratified the status quo
of the time. The Court reasoned that while the Fourteenth Amendment
gave equality of legal rights to African Americans, it did not guarantee
them equality of social rights. 26 This holding laid the foundation for the
system of "separate but equal" public schools that quickly became the
accepted legal norm in the United States. 27
The "separate but equal" doctrine provided additional support for
school systems to continue the practice of racial segregation. For
instance, the Court buttressed its argument for the "separate but equal"
doctrine by citing to lower court cases that approved segregation in the
schools. One of the cases relied on by the Plessy court involved
segregation efforts in Boston public schools, which had been approved by
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 2 s In short, Plessy simply provided
additional judicial support for school systems to continue this racially
divisive practice.
C.

Brown v. Board of Education

It was not until 58 years later that the Supreme Court struck down
the "separate but equal" system of schools. In Brown v. Board of
Education, African American minors challenged the judgment of the

from there was imprisoned in the parish jail.
21. Jd.at542.
22. !d. at 540.
23. Id.
24. ld. at 552.
25. Id. at 550-51. The court went on to state that "[i]n determining the question of
reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions
of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public
peace and good order." Id.
26. Id. at 551-52.
27. See Perea et a!., supra n. 13, at 147. "The Plessy decision gave the Supreme Court's
sanction to the separate-but-equal jim Crow laws of the late nineteenth century and probably fueled
a dramatic expansion in the use of these laws during the early decades of the twentieth.'' !d. See also
C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career offim Crow 54 (Oxford U. Press 1957).
28. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-46. The case referred to was Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass.
198, 206 (1849), wherein the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the general school
committee of Boston had power to make provision for the instruction of colored children in separate
schools established exclusively for them, and to prohibit their attendance in the other schools.
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United States District Courts for the Districts of Kansas, South Carolina,
Virginia and Delaware. 29 Although the lower courts had held that
segregation in public education had a detrimental effect upon African
American children, it denied that the schools were substantially unequal
with respect to buildings, transportation, and educational qualifications
of teachers. 30 In so ruling, the lower courts relied on the "separate but
equal doctrine" originally set forth by the Supreme Court in Plessy. 11
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the ruling of the
lower court, overturned Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine, and
expressly held that segregation was a denial of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 32 In so holding, the Court also noted that
equality did not just apply to legal equality, as was announced in Plessy. 33
Instead, the Court reasoned, the Fourteenth Amendment properly
applied to civil and social equality as wel1. 34

D.

Brown's Progeny

Brown made its way back to the Supreme Court a year later, at which
time the Court instructed the School Board to make a "prompt and
reasonable start" towards compliance with its prior ruling. 35 It was clear
that the Supreme Court intended integration. The Supreme Court
clarified and expanded Brown when ruling on the Swann cases of 1971. 36
29. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486. Interestingly, Brown was not the tlrst case to explicitly reject the
reasoning of Plessy. Mendez v. Westminister Sch. Dist. of Orange County, 64 F Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Cal.
1946), involved a statute mandating the segregation of Mexican-American students from Englishspeaking pupils. In that case, the court reasoned that "a paramount requisite in the American system of
public education is social equality. It must be open to all children by unified school association
regardless of lineage." Id. An interesting footnote is that this case "led to the repeal of C:alil(m1ia's
segregation statutes." See Perea eta!., supra n. 13, at 674. California Governor Earl Warren "signed the
legislation repealing the segregation statutes." Id. Mr. Warren later served as Chief justice of the United
States Supreme Court and wrote the majority opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.
30. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486.
31. Id. at 488.

32. Id. at 494-95. The court stated that "[wjhatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any
language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected." Id. The Court went on to conclude
that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly
situated for whom the actions have been broug}lt are, by reason of the segregation complained of,
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." !d. at 495.
33. Id. at 492.

34. See id. For a very detailed account of the long struggle for civil rights that ultimately led
up to Brown, see Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and
Black America's Struggle for Equality, (Alfred A. Knopf; Inc. 1975).
35. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955).
36. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1, 16 {1971); N.C. St. Bd. of
Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43,43 (1971).
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In the first of these cases, the Court stated that school authorities have
"broad power to formulate and implement educational policy," 37
including prescribing a specific percentage of minority students to attend
each school "in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society." 38
These statements provided powerful authority for permitting, or even
requiring, school officials to consider race when assigning students to
schools within their districts.

Ill.

A SURVEY OF RECENT CASES HIGHLIGHTING THE PROBLEM
A.

Standard of Review

Four relatively recent cases involve the use of race-based admissions
standards in the K-12 public school setting. 39 In each case, K-12 admissions programs that considered race as a key criterion were challenged
for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A strict scrutiny standard, established in Adarand Construction, Inc.
v. Pena, was applied in each of the four cases. 40 In Adarand, the Supreme
Court held that all racial classifications instituted by governmental entities
are subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review. 41 This standard requires
that the government demonstrate a compelling interest for employing a
race-based classification. 42 It also mandates that the program instituted by
the government must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 43

B.

Wessmann v. Gittens, 1st Circuit

One of the recent cases dealing with admissions policies of K-12
public schools was Wessmann v. Gittens, decided by the First Circuit in
late 1998. Wessmann was a case involving "examination schools"magnet schools that filled half their seats through flexible racial/ethnic
guidelines-which were operated by the City of Boston. 44 In its review,

37. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
3H. ld.
39. See Wcssmann, 160 F.3d at 792~93; Brewer, 212 1'.3d at 740; Tuttle, 19S F.3d at 700;
Hunter. 190 F.3d at 1062.
40. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200,224 (1995) [hereinafter Adarand].
41. ld.
42. !d. at 237 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
44. "The City of Boston operates three renowned 'examination schools,' the most prestigious
of which is Boston Latin School (BLS)." Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 791. In 1974, the City of Boston was
fill!nd "to have violated the constitutional rights of African-American children by promoting and
maintaining a dual public school system." Id. at 792. Although no specific evidence was produced to
show discrimination, one of the classic symptoms of segregation was sufficient for the court: an
exceptionally low number of African American students attended BLS. Id. The remedy offered by
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the First Circuit concluded that the strict scrutiny standard applied. It
began its analysis by subjecting the admissions program to the first prong
of the strict scrutiny analysis: the compelling governmental interest test. 45
The court then acknowledged that there was a split among courts as to
whether a compelling government interest must be remedial in nature. 46
If so, there exists a contention that the attainment of diversity, arguably a
non-remedial goal, is not a proper governmental objective. After some
discussion on the matter, however, the court reserved ruling definitively
on the matter and cautiously proceeded under the assumption that
diversity could be a compelling governmental interest. 47
The court next turned to the question of whether the Boston
program was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling governmental
interest of racial diversity. 48 However, soon after announcing the
narrowly tailored means test, the court digressed to a discussion about
whether or not diversity was a valid compelling governmental interest. 49
In the end, the court never did reach the question of whether the
program was narrowly tailored. 50
the court was to obligate BLS to ensure that at least 35% of each entering class be composed of
African-American and Hispanic students. Id. By 1987, the examination schools were no longer
under a federal court mandate to maintain the 35% set-aside. Jd. The set-aside program continued
until 1995 when a disappointed applicant challenged its constitutionality, resulting in a courtordered injunction and the discontinuance of the program. Jd. at 792-93. As part of an effort to
avoid a big drop in the number of minority entrants, a new policy was implemented. Jd. at 793. This
policy filled half of the seats for each examination school based on academic performance, and filled
the other half based on flexible racial/ethnic guidelines. Id. Sarah Wessmann was a student who was
excluded from admission, and instituted a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the program.
Jd. The district court held the program to be constitutional and an appeal quickly followed. Jd. at
794.
45. See id. at 794. While the Supreme Court had employed the strict scrutiny standard for
some time, its majority opinion in Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224, very clearly stated that any racial
classification imposed by the government would be subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. !d.
46. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 795. The first Circuit Court noted the opinion of the Fifth Circuit
in Hopwood v. St. of Tex., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325
(2003), but expressly declined to accept its reasoning; instead it decided to assume that Bakke was
still good law and that racial diversity could be a compelling government interest based on the
statement from justice Powell in that case. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796. The Bakke case involved a
race-based admissions policy at the University of California at Davis. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. In that
case, justice Powell wrote that diversity could be a compelling governmental interest in an
educational setting. Jd. at 311. The Hopwood case involved a race-based admissions program at the
University of Texas wherein the court explicitly rejected Bakke as binding and stated that diversity
could never be a compelling governmental interest because it was not remedial in nature. Hopwood,
78 F.3d at 948.
47. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796.
48. Jd. at 796.
49. See id. at 796-800. The court concluded that "the School Committee's Policy does not
meet the Bakke standard an<i, accordingly, that the concept of 'diversity' implemented by BLS does
not justify a race-based classification." I d. at 800.
50. Jd.

51]

K-12 ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS

59

The Wessmann court's discussion of diversity as a compelling
governmental interest is altogether confusing. While the court gave lip
service to accepting diversity as a compelling governmental interest, it
spent the next several pages of its opinion picking apart the school's
program because it had diversity as its stated goal. 51 And, whereas the
court stated that it would not rule on whether diversity could be a
compelling governmental interest, it nevertheless proceeded to lay out
arguments about why it is probably not a compelling governmental
interest. 5 2 In the end, the court concluded that the school's program was
unconstitutionaP 3 The result caused very mixed signals. It was obvious
the court was reluctant to embrace the diverse student body rationale as a
correct principle of law. 54
C. Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board, 4th Circuit

In January 1999, the Fourth Circuit decided Tuttle v. Arlington
County School Board. 55 In Tuttle, the court analyzed the Arlington
County School Board's weighted admissions policy that considered race
in its review of candidate files. 56 The specific question before the court
was whether an oversubscribed public school could use a weighted
lottery in admissions proceedings to promote racial and ethnic diversity
in its student body. 57 Previously, the Fourth Circuit had upheld the
remedial policy of the Arlington County School Board to achieve a

51. Id. at 800-05.
52. Id. at 796-800.
53. !d. at 800.
54. See Preston Green, May Examination Schools Use Racial Preferences in Their Admissions
Process?: Wessmann v. Gittens, 135 Educ. L. Rep. 873, 889 (1999) (pointing out that educational
institutions will have a difficult time meeting requirements established by the Supreme Court for
showing that their admissions programs meet the compelling interest of eliminating the vestiges of
past discrimination).
55.

195 F. 3d at 702.

56. Td. at 700.
57. Id. As part of its normal operations, the School Board operated the Arlington Traditional
School ("ATS"), whose stated goal was not the remedy of past discrimination, but rather to promote
racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic diversity. Td. at 701. ATS was an alternative kindergarten whose
claim was to teach students in a "traditional" format. Id. Admission was not based upon merit but
rather solely upon availability. Td. Since demand always outweighed the number of available seats, a
lottery system was introduced by which students would be selected. Td. "The probabilities associated
with each applicant's lottery number were weighted so that applicants from under-represented
[racial and ethnic] groups ... had an increased probability of selection.· Id. at 702. This program
was challenged on constitutional grounds, with the allegation that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth Amendment. Td. The district court ruled that the program was
unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against the School Board. Id. at 700. The case
was then appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. /d.
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unitary school district. sH This time, the court would rule on whether
classroom diversity was a legitimate policy.
Because the program utilized racial classification, the court employed
the strict scrutiny standard in its evaluation of the program. 5 ~ In its review
of the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny test, the court noted a
split of authority as to whether diversity serves a compelling governmental
interest. 60 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit went the same route as the First
Circuit in Wessmann; it explicitly stated that "until the Supreme Court
provides decisive guidance, we will assume, without so holding, that
diversity may be a compelling government interest."61
The court then moved to its analysis of whether the admissions
program was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling government
interest of racial diversity. 62 In a very poorly reasoned section of its
opinion/' 3 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the program was not
narrowly tailored and struck the admissions program down as
unconstitutional. 64
As its rubric for analyzing the narrow tailoring issue, the Fourth
Circuit employed five factors it had previously utilized in a vastly
dissimilar case involving the promotion of non-minority police officers
in North Carolina. 65 The five "narrow tailoring" factors considered
included: (1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral policies; (2) the
planned duration of the policy; (3) the relationship between the
numerical goal and the percentage of minority group member in the
relevant population or work force; (4) the flexibility of the policy; and (5)
the burden of the policy on innocent third parties. 66 The court hurriedly
went through each of the factors, summarily concluding that the
program met none of them, and proceeded to strike down the admissions
program as unconstitutional. 67
58. Hart v. County Sch. Bd. of Arlington County, Va., 459 F.2d 981,982 (4th C:ir. !972).
59. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 703. "We review racial classifications under strict scrutiny." /d.
60. Id. at 704.
61. ld. at 705 (emphasis added).
62. Id.
63. A thorough discussion of the court's misapplication of its arbitrarily chosen factors in
analyzing whether the program was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling governmental interest
of diversity is discussed at length.
64. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705-07.
65. Id. at 706. The case from which the factors were borrowed was Hayes v. N. St. L
Enforcement Officers Assn., 10 F.3d 207,216 (4th C:ir. 1993).
66. See Tuttle, 195 f.3d at 706.
67. /d. at 706-07. For a discussion on the impact Tuttle and similar decisions, see ( ;erard
Toussaint Robinson, Can the Spirit of Brown Survive in the Era of School Choice? A /,ega! awl l'o/icy
Perspective, 45 How. L.). 281, 318-20 (Winter 2002) (stating that these judicial decisions were
deliberate legal attacks on Brown's call for racially integrated public schools).
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Hunter v. Regents of the University of California, 9th Circuit

The Ninth Circuit also heard a case involving the consideration of
race in a K-12 public school setting. 68 This case involved an elementary
school used as a research laboratory by UCLA's Graduate School of
Education and Information Studies. 69 As was the case with its sister
circuits, the Ninth Circuit conducted an analysis of the University
Elementary School (UES) program using the strict scrutiny review
standard. 711 As if to avoid the question of whether diversity was a
compelling interest, the court concluded that the Regents' "interest in
operating a research-oriented elementary school [was] compelling." 71 To
preemptively quash any backlash against this conclusion, the majority
listed some noteworthy caveats. 72 First, the court noted that it was not
UES's designation as a laboratory school that justified its admission
process. 73 Second, UES's stated mission of educational research likewise
did not justify its admissions process. 74 Finally, although research was
central to the UES's charter, the court did not believe its ruling would
"lead to racial classification in 'every stratum of a state's public education
system'. "75
The court next turned to the second prong of the strict scrutiny
standard and questioned whether the admissions program was narrowly
tailored to serve the purpose of California's compelling governmental
interest. 76 In finding that the program was narrowly tailored, the court
pointed to the reasoning of the lower court as persuasive: "[i]t would not
be possible, nor would it be reasonable, to require the defendants to

b8. Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1062.
69. /d. The University Elementary School (UES) had the stated research and training mission to
help the State of California meet the needs of students in multicultural urban schools. Id. To this end,
UES considered gender, race/ethnicity, and tamily income in its admissions process to obtain the
desired student population. Id. One of the students who was not selected for admission brought suit,
through her parents, against the Regents of the University of California under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Jd. at 1063. The suit challenged the constitutionality of the admissions program. Id.
The district court concluded that the admissions program met the burden of strict scrutiny review, and
ruled in favor of the Defendants. /d. The Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Jd.

70. /d. at I 063.
71.

Jd. at 1064.

72. Jd. at I 065.
73. Jd. at 1066. See also jason Walbourn, Student Author, Strict in Theory, but Not Fatal in
Fact: lluntcr v. Rexents of the University of California and the Case for Educational Research as a New
Compelling State Interest, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 183, 200-02 (1998) (noting that a state's interest in
educational research compares favorably with other interests that have been asserted in support of
racial classitlcations).
74. See Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1065.
75.

76.

Jd.
Jd.

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

62

[2004

attempt to obtain an ethnically diverse representative sample of students
without the use of specific racial targets and classifications." 77 The court
went on to hold that judges who review the substance of a genuine
academic decision (in this case, the manner of research), should show
great respect for the faculty's professional judgment.n
E.

Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School District, 2d Circuit

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard a case that involved a
transfer program adopted by the West Irondequoit Central School
District as part of a voluntary desegregation effort that started in 1965. 7Y
The court first addressed the issue of whether the reduction of racial
isolation in participating schools was a compelling government interest. 80
The court pointed out that only the Fifth Circuit had ever ruled that the
remedying of past wrongs by a governmental entity is the only
compelling state interest to justify racial classifications, 81 and
acknowledged that there was significant disagreement among the circuit
courts as to whether the Fifth Circuit view was consistent with Supreme
Court precedent 82
However, the court rejected the Fifth Circuit's remedial argument for
two reasons. First, the Fifth Circuit was the lone circuit to ever hold that
a non-remedial state interest, such as diversity, may never justify racebased programs in the educational context. 83 Second, the Second Circuit
itself had never barred diversity or other non-remedial interests from

77. !d. at 1066.
78. Id.
79. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 741. One of the stated goals of the program was to reduce minority group
isolation. Id. "In other words, the program is designed to reduce the percentage of minority students in
predominantly minority city schools, and to increase the percentage of minority students in
predominantly white suburban schools." !d. at 742 (quoting Brewer v. W. Irondequoit C. Sch. Dist., 32
F. Supp. 2d 619, 621 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)). As the program was then being administered, only minority
pupils were allowed to transfer from predominantly minority city schools to participating suburban
schools, and only non-minority students were permitted to transfer from suburban schools to city
schools. Id. at 743. A white student, through his parents, brought suit against the school district when
he was denied the opportunity to transfer from his predominately minority city school to a suburban
school. !d. The district court found the program to be unconstitutional and entered a mandatory
injunction against the School District. Id. An appeal to the Second Circuit quickly followed. Id.
80. I d. at 745.
81. See id. at 747. The Fifth Circuit case referred to is Hopwood, discussed supra at n. 46,
wherein the Fifth Circuit expressly held that diversity could not be a compelling governmental
interest since it was not remedial in nature.
82. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 747. The court stated that "notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's
holding in this regard, there is much disagreement among the circuit courts as to whether this is, in
fact, the state of the law under current Supreme Court jurisprudence." !d.
83. !d. at 747.
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being compelling in the educational setting. 84 In fact, there was binding
precedent in the Second Circuit that explicitly stated that reducing de
facto segregation serves a compelling government interest. 85 To that end,
the court concluded that a compelling government interest existed in
programs that have as their objective the reduction of racial isolation
stemming from de facto segregation. 86
The court next conducted a review of whether the court below had
abused its discretion in determining that the program was not narrowly
tailored to meet the goal of true diversity. 87 The court quickly pointed
out that since "true diversity" was not the stated goal of the program, the
lower court would need to revisit its narrowly tailored analysis. 88 The
court did note, however, that so long as reduction of racial isolation is a
constitutionally permissible goal, there is no more effective means of
achieving that goal than to base decisions on race. 89 The Second Circuit
vacated the decision of the lower court and remanded the case to trial. 90
IV.

A.

ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS

Fundamental Problems with Strict Scrutiny in K-12 Admissions

To understand some of the inherent defects associated with the strict
scrutiny standard, it is imperative to recall its birth. The Supreme Court
first announced this standard in its review of the infamous Japanese
internment that occurred during World War IU 1 In that case, under
conditions that have since been determined to be so deplorable that the
United States Government issued an apology and paid reparations to
those whom the government had detained, 92 the Supreme Court held that
84. Id. at 752.
85. Id. The court stated that it was bound by prior precedent that "a compelling interest can
be found in a program that has as its object the reduction of racial isolation and what appears to be
de facto segregation." Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 752-53.
89. Id. at 753. See also Faiz Ahmad, Student Author, Brewer v. West Irondequoit C. Sch. Dist.,
7 Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.). 155 (Spring 2001) (concluding that when race coincides with
a greater societal problem such as racial isolation, the consideration of race is appropriate).
90. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 753.
91. Sec Korematsu v. U.S, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1911) (stating that the Court was not prepared to
say that the actions of the military were not justified).
92. See Perea et al., supra n. 13, at 411-12. The authors note that "due to the activism of advocates
for the interned japanese-American families, the survivors and descendants of persons interned during
World War II ultimately received official letters of apology from the United States Government, signed by
President George Bush, and payments of $20,000 per survivor in partial reparations." See also Yasuko I.
Takezawa, Breaking the Silence: Redress and Japanese American Ethnicity, 51-59 (Cornell U. Press 1995).
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the race-based classifications utilized in 1941 met the standard of strict
scrutiny. 93 And while this demonstrates that there is indeed some
flexibility in the standard (which means that courts can safely apply the
standard and find a program to meet its requirements without fear of
being the first court to so decide), this has not been the path chosen by
the courts that have heard most cases involving the strict scrutiny
analysis. Indeed, many of the courts appear to utilize the '"strict' in
theory and, fatal in fact" 94 theme of strict scrutiny to strike down
programs they find offensive, without providing solid reasoning to back
up their decision.
As should be obvious from a review of the preceding K-12 public
school cases, the courts must analyze two distinct areas when reviewing
the issue of race-based admissions programs in K-12 public schools: (1)
whether the program serves a compelling governmental interest; and (2)
whether the program is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. These
two areas are the prongs of the strict scrutiny standard announced by the
Supreme Court in Adarand and followed by all courts that consider
programs containing racial classifications and accompanying challenges
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B.

Is There a Compelling Governmental Interest?

Two principal arguments support consideration of race in K-12
public school admissions programs. The first argument is that racial
diversity is a compelling governmental interest, and that those school
districts that name diversity as the purpose of their various admissions
programs therefore pass this prong of the test. 95 A second argument that
supports consideration of race as a compelling governmental interest is
that the government is trying to reduce de facto segregation and racial
isolation in K-12 public school admissions programs that considers race.
1.

The Diversity Argument

One of the interesting aspects of the diversity argument is that none
of the circuit courts, except one, has ever explicitly rejected it.% In

93. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
94. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search a( Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 ( 1972).
95. See Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value in American Higher Education'. 52 Ha. L.
Rev. 861, 880-84 (2000) (arguing that admissions programs aimed at promoting racial and ethnic
diversity in a student body are justified because they serve an internal educational good by
promoting value diversity).
96. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932. For a discussion detailing potential problems with this
decision, See e.g. Philip T.K. Daniel & Kyle Edward Tim ken, The Uumors of My neath Have llecn
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addition, none of the cases described above, when dealing with racebased admissions in K-12 schools, specifically rejected diversity as a
compelling governmental interest. 97 However, those cases that found the
K-12 admissions plans unconstitutional did so because the courts were
thoroughly convinced that the programs were not narrowly tailored.n
Because they viewed the programs at issue as not satisfying the "narrowly
tailored" prong of the analysis, these courts likely felt that they could
dodge the issue of whether diversity serves a compelling governmental
interest. Therefore, it is probably not enough to argue that because these
cases have not ruled against the question in the K-12 context, the issue is
resolved. 99
The most obvious support for the notion that diversity is a
compelling governmental interest is the express holding of the Supreme
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger. 100 Among other things, this opinion
attempted to clear away any confusion arising from the Court's
splintered decision in U.S. v. Bakke from 25 years earlier regarding
whether diversity is a compelling governmental interest in the
educational context. 101 Writing for the majority in Grutter, Justice

Exaggerated: Hopwood's Error In "Discarding" Bakke, 28 ).L. & Educ 391, 417 (1999) (concluding
that the Fifth Circuit overstepped its authority by rejecting justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as the
law of the land ); Emily V. Pastorius, Student Author, The Erosion of Af)irmative Action: The Fifth
Cirwit Contradicts the Supreme Court on the Issue of Diversity, 27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 459, 496
( 1997) (calling the Fifth Circuit decision a dramatic and unnecessary leap). Moreover, the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Grutter limits the utility of this decision, and likely serves to
overrule its finding. 123 S. Ct. at 2337 ("we endorse justice Powell's view that student body diversity
is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions").
97. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796; Brewer, 212 F.3d at 752; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705; Hwzter,
190 F.3d at 1065.
'!K. Sec Wessmamz, 160 F.3d at 800; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705-08.
99. See Victor G. Rosenblum, Surveying the Current Legal Landscape for Affirmative Action in
Admissions, 27 ).C. & U.L. 709, 719-20 (Winter 2001) (noting the position taken by many courts that
the issue of whether diversity serves a compelling governmental interest is open).
100. c;ruller, 123 s. Ct. at 2325.
101. justice Powell wrote that the "attainment of a diverse student body ... clearly is a
constitutionally permissible goal." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. That case had no majority decision,
with f(nlr justices voting to allow the use of racial preferences, and four other justices voting to strike
down the quota system that the University of California was then employing. Jd. at 271-72.
However, it was justice Powell's opinion, which in essence formed a majority on each of these issues,
which was the conclusive and deciding factor. Id. at 272. See also Martin D. Carcieri, The Wages of
Taking llakkc Serio11sly: Federal judicial Oversight of the Public University Admissions Process, BYU
Educ. & L.). 161, 163-64 (2001) (arguing that courts have not been vigilant in applying justice
Powell's opinion regarding diversity in higher education). Because justice Powell wrote alone, critics
of the diversity argument long argued that his statement was not the opinion of the Court, and
therefore was not binding upon later courts that visit the issue. See e.g. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948;
Terry Carter, On A lioll(back): After Its Big Win in The Hopwood Case, Setting Aside Affirmative
Action at the University of Texas Law School, The Center For Individual Rights Is On A Mission-To
Do More of the Same at Other Public Universities, 84 ABA). 54 (Feb. 1998).
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O'Connor stated that not only did the law school at issue have a
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body, 102 but that, more
generally, "student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can
justify the use of race in university admissions." 103
Grutter also provides a potent antidote to the traditional argument
against diversity serving a compelling governmental interest, which states
that only remedial interests qualify as compelling governmental
interests. 104 Critics of race-based admissions programs have, to this
point, relied primarily on Justice O'Conner's statement in Richmond v.
f.A. Croson [hereinafter Croson] that consideration of race in a nonremedial setting could lead to racial hostility. 105 However, there are
several reasons why O'Conner's assertion has no binding precedential
value. As a threshold matter, Justice O'Connor's statement about
remedial interests was contained in a section of the case that only
constituted a plurality of the Court 106 -it was purely dicta. Second, the
court did not hold that only remedial interests could be compelling. 107
Further, two subsequent cases, decided by the Seventh and the Ninth
Circuit respectively, affirm that O'Conner's statement was not binding
precedent. In each case, the court allowed for racial classifications in a
non- remedial setting. 10H Finally, Justice O'Connor herself wrote in
Waters v. Churchill, a post-Croson majority opinion, that the Supreme
Court had "never set forth a general test to determine what constitutes a
compelling state interest." 109 And, to make certain that she was not
misunderstood, O'Conner curtly added in Grutter that "we [The
Supreme Court] have never held that the only governmental use of race
that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination." 110
In short, there is now clear, unequivocal precedent for the
proposition that diversity constitutes a compelling governmental
interest. 111 However, there are natural limitations that accompany this
102.
103.
104.
354 (D.C.
I 05.

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-39.
Id. at 2337.
See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945-46; Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. v. F. C. C., 141 !'.3d 344,
Cir. 1998) (stating that diversity cannot be elevated to compelling level).
City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 ( 1989).

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996); Smith v. U. of Wash. Law Sc/1., 233
F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000). In Wittmer, the 7th Circuit specifically noted that the language from
Croson regarding remedial interests was purely dicta. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 919. It went on to hold that
the use of racial classifications in promoting directors in boot camps for young criminals was a
compelling governmental interest. I d. at 921.
109. 551 U.S. 661,671 (1994).
110. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
Ill. I d. at 2337.
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holding. First, this ruling relates to higher education, and courts opposed
to using race as an admissions criterion may find this distinction
persuasive when considering a race-based admissions program in the K-12
context. Second, Grutter itself imposed severe restrictions on the narrowly
tailored aspect of strict scrutiny review, such that even where race may be
considered, numerous limiting factors exist. 112 Third, although Bakke
appeared to provide fertile ground for the idea that diversity was a
compelling state interest, even the courts that assumed so for the sake of
argument routinely struck down programs based on their supposed
failure to satisfy the narrowly tailored prong. 113 Thus, even with Supreme Court approval of diversity as a compelling government interest,
there is little reason to believe that courts will significantly alter their
approach in race-based admissions cases. Indeed, Grutter may prove to
be of limited utility in an era where most courts appear antagonistic to
any school program that seeks to achieve diversity.

2.

Reduction of De Facto Segregation

The reduction of de facto segregation and racial isolation in K-12
public schools is a second reason for these schools to consider the race of
its applicants in their admissions programs. 114 One of the principal
benefits of this argument is that it stays altogether away from the endless
debate about whether diversity alone is a compelling governmental
interest, that has gone on among judiciaries ever since Bakke. 115 An
equally strong feature of this argument is that Brown and its progeny
support it. 116 The Supreme Court plainly held in Brown that integration,
indeed the elimination of the practice of segregation, was the goal that
school districts should seek. 117 From this Supreme Court ruling which

112. See id. at 2343-43, 2345-46 (Some limitations the Court enumerated were prohibiting the
use of quota systems, requiring that race cannot be a determining factor, requiring that any
preference not unduly harm or burden members of any racial group, and that any plan to prefer a
race must be limited in time.).
113. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 791; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 702.
114. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 753 (concluding that the reduction of racial isolation stemming
from de facto segregation was a compelling governmental interest).
115. See, e.g., Steven M. Kirkelie, Higher Education Admissions and Diversity: The Continuing
Vitality of Bakke v. Regents of the University of California and an Attempt to Reconcile Powell's and
Brennan's Opinions, 38 Willamette L. Rev. 615, 635 (2002) (noting that cases dealing with the
concept of diversity in higher education have been fragmented and have placed a cloud of suspicion
over the continuing vitality of Bakke as controlling precedent).
116. See N.C. St. Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 46; Swann, 402 U.S. at 16; Brown, 349 U.S. at 301;
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
117. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495-96. While the Brown decision dealt with de jure segregation,
courts have found the Brown decision to extend to cases of de facto segregation as well. See e.g.
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of L.A., 551 P.2d 28, 30 (Cal. 1976), superseded, Crawford v.
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disbanded the dual system of schools, comes the logical conclusion that
reducing segregation is a compelling governmental interest.
It may, therefore, be advisable for those who wish to defend racebased admissions practices in K-12 public schools to couch their
programs in terms of an "elimination of de facto segregation" rationale.
This rationale was approved by the Supreme Court in Swann, 11 H and by
the Second Circuit in Brewer. 11 Y It is likely that courts would accept this
rationale in cases involving transfer programs, magnet and research
schools since they fall under the K-12 public school umbrella wherein
the precedents of Brown and Swann are binding.
The premise of this approach-that de facto segregation is a growing
problem in elementary and secondary schools in the United States-is
supported by recent scholarly research.l211 For example, in July 2001, the
Civil Rights Project at Harvard University released a study showing that
segregation continued to intensify throughout the 1990s. !21 Indeed,
researchers determined that much of the progress for minority students
in K-12 public school equality was eliminated in the 1990's-a decade
that included three Supreme Court decisions that drastically limited
desegregation remedies. 122 These statistics regarding the resegregation of
schools, together with an understanding of many courts' approach to
diversity as a goal of the government in educational settings, serve to
create a clear path that school district personnel should take when

Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1285 (2002) (stating that school
boards in California "bear a constitutional obligation to undertake reasonably feasible steps to
alleviate such racial segregation in the public schools, regardless of the cause of such segregation").
118. In Grutter's majority opinion, justice O'Connor cited to numerous amici briefs that
pointed to the educational benefits that flow from being exposed to persons of different
backgrounds. 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40. She also made mention of the amici briefs filed by major
American businesses that made clear that the skills needed in today' s global marketplace can only be
developed by exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. ld. at 2340. Such
practical benefits from the reduction of racial isolation provides further support for the use of racebased admissions programs in K-12 schools, whose primary mission is to prepare students for "work
and citizenship." ld.

119. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 747-52.
120. See Gary Orfield & Nora Gordon, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, Schools
More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, <http:www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/deseg/separate_schoolsOI.php> (July 17, 20()] ).
12!. Id.
122. According to the study, 70.2% of the nation's black students now attend predominantly
minority schools (i.e., minority enrollment of over 50%), which is up significantly from the low point
of62.9o/o in 1980. Id. More than a third of the nation's black students attend schools with a minority
enrollment of 90-100%. Id. The proportion of black students in such schools has been rising
consistently since 1986, when it was at a low point of 32.5%. Id. White students remain the most
segregated from other races in their schools. Id. Whites on average attend schools where more than
80% of the students are white and less than 20% of the students are from all of the other racial and
ethnic groups combined. Id.
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constructing an admissions program for their non-traditional public
schools. At the outset, it is essential that school district personnel give
the program the proper label. Indeed, courts seem most hostile to
programs that simply label their purpose as "racial diversity" 123 and
significantly more welcoming to programs that list "reduction of de facto
segregation" as their purported goal. 124 Therefore, the best approach for
school district administrators to take may be to name "reduction of racial
isolation stemming from de facto segregation" as the purpose of an
admissions program that considers the race of its applicants, and to build
the actual structure of the program around that purpose. By choosing
this route, practitioners stay away from the oft contested "diversity"
debate. This route also draws strength from the Supreme Court's
holdings in Brown and Swann, thereby lending additional credence to the
idea that desegregation is a compelling governmental interest. 125
C.

I.

"Narrowly Tailored Means" Prong of the Strict Scrutiny Standard
The Limited Utility of Rigid Factors

The current application of the narrowly tailored means standard of
the strict scrutiny analysis, at least in the context of K-12 public school
admissions programs, is in need of a serious overhaul. As is readily
apparent from the Tuttle case above, the actual standards utilized in a
given court's narrowly tailored analysis are often arbitrary and rigidwhich are ironically two factors that courts find offensive in admissions
programs that take race into account. 126 The factors utilized by the Tuttle
court are similar in scope and substance to factors applied by other
courts when applying the narrowly tailored means prong of the strict
scrutiny standard; therefore, it is a worthwhile exercise to examine the
factors in order to determine their efficacy and to ascertain their
usefulness. 127
123. Sec e.g. Wcssmann, 160 F.3d at 796-800; Hopwood, 78 F3d at 948.
124. Brewer, 212 !:'.3d at 752.
125. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495-96 (holding segregation to be a deprivation of equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown, 349 U.S. at 300 (ordering the School District to make a
"prompt and reasonable start" in compliance with the earlier Brown decision); Swann, 402 U.S. at 16
(staling that school authorities have broad power to formulate educational policy).
126. Tuttle, 195 F. 3d at 705-07.
127. The purp<"c of this exercise is to determine the utility of "factors" in determining whether
or not a program is narrowly tailored. The Tuttle case was chosen because it is one of the main cases
examined in this article, and it is the case that relied most heavily upon a given set of factors. Most
courts examining this second prong of strict scrutiny employ these or similar factors; theref(He,
much of the reasoning and analysis to follow will have broad application in cases similar to Tuttle.
In other words, the flaws inherent in the Tuttle court's analysis will most likely be present, in a very
general manner at least, in other courts' analysis of comparable factors.
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The court in Tuttle borrowed and misapplied analytical factors from
a 1987 plurality decision of the Supreme Court that dealt with the denial
of promotions to African-American applicants working in the State of
Alabama. 128 The most flagrant misapplication by the Tuttle court came
with its analysis of the first factor: the efficacy of alternative race-neutral
policies. The court stated that it was obvious that there were viable
alternative race-neutral policies because the Study Committee that
recommended the program had also proposed one or more race-neutral
alternatives to promote racial diversity. 129
However, the court's reasoning is flawed for at least two reasons.
First, just because a program was proposed does not mean that it was a
viable option. Second, the fact that the Committee ended up selecting
the race-based program proves that its study of the situation resulted in a
verdict that this was the best way to achieve the district's goals. However,
this explanation was of no consequence to the Fourth Circuit, which
seemed content to disregard this factor in one short, disinterested
paragraph. 130
The court's analysis of the third factor is equally perplexing. The
court stated that although spots are not set aside for minority applicants,
the same result is practically reached because of the odds being skewed. 131
The court then mistakenly reasoned that: "The Policy's two goals, to
provide students with the educational benefits of diversity and to help the
School Board better serve the diverse groups of students in its district, do
not require racial balancing."' 32 To wit: following the reasoning of the
court, even if white applicants fill 68 of the 69 seats at the school, the
goals of classroom diversity and service to students of diverse
backgrounds is met. This conclusion does not square with common
sense-how can the school district be expected to cater to the needs of
diversity when it is not allowed to actually consider diversity in making
classroom assignments?
The court's reasoning elsewhere in the case is similarly unpersuasive,
but does not appear as egregious as that which has been listed above. 133
Nevertheless, the defects indicated above are sufficient to demonstrate
that the Fourth Circuit chose a rigid and arbitrary method by which to
evaluate the usefulness of a program that considers race. 134 Interestingly,

128. U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
129. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 707.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 705-07.
134. See id. at 706 (The court itself noted that the factors would be difficult to assess.).

51]

K-12 ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS

71

the Fourth Circuit dug its heels in deep on this issue, employing the same
unsound reasoning it had used in Tuttle to strike down an analogous case
in l999Y 5

2.

A More Appropriate Application

Comparable arguments for arbitrariness can be made against other
cases as well, since it seems that each Circuit randomly plucks from its
case law a set of factors that it deems helpful in striking down admissions
programs. 136 However, simply pointing to the flaws of current narrow
tailoring analysis does not solve the problem. Nevertheless, there is a
solution, and its foundation is language employed by the Supreme Court
in Adarand. In Adarand, the Court's majority explicitly stated that the
strict scrutiny standard applies to all cases involving racial
classifications. 137 The Supreme Court then provided critical insight into
the purpose of the strict scrutiny standard:
[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of
race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures
that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is
little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.u~

In other words, the Supreme Court wants proof that there is a sound,
legitimate reason for the government to make a race-conscious
decision-the Court wants assurance that governmental agencies are not
using race as a pretext for discrimination. In the K-12 context, school
district personnel can point to the many benefits of a diverse class of
students as proof that there is no hidden agenda when it comes to
considering the race of applicants to non-traditional schools. 139
135. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 130-35 (4th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the school district's transfer plan, which considered the race of the applicants, did not
pass constitutional muster).
136. See e.g. johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1252 (lith C:ir. 2001)
(latching on to the Supreme Court's obscure and unrelated "Paradise factors" in order to justify
striking down an admissions program that took race into consideration).
137. 515 U.S. at 226.
138. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
139. The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University commissioned a study into whether
diversity in elementary and secondary schools was of any benefit to the students. See Michal
Kurlaender & john Yun, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, The Impact of Racial and
Ethnic Diversity on Educational Outcomes: Cambridge, MA School District, <http:www.
civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/diversity/cambridge_diversity.php> (Jan. 29, 2002) ("Results
from the survey suggest positive educational impacts of diversity for students in the district. Overall,
a substantial majority of students report a strong level of comfort with members of other racial and
ethnic groups." In addition, "students indicate that their school experiences have increased their
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In a court's consideration of K-12 race-based admissions policies, a
relaxing of the strict scrutiny standard is in order. This relaxation can
come properly by the way that courts handle the question of whether a
program is narrowly tailored. As is obvious from a review of the current
cases on this issue, courts are sometimes quick to strike down a program
because it does not satisfY some designated set of factors. 1' 11 The courts, in
effect, are trying to shove square pegs through round holes-a futile effort
indeed. The real question, consistent with Adarand, should be whether the
government has a legitimate reason for considering race or whether the
program is simply a pretext for discrimination. The answer to this
question, in the context of admissions programs in K-12 public schools
that consider race, based on educational jurisprudence in the United States
for the past 50 years, must be that the programs are legitimate.
Furthermore, the legitimate reason to consider race-altogether
different from the arguments that raged wildly in the context of schools
of higher education-is that the Supreme Court has ruled against
segregation and has essentially advocated a plan of integration in the K12 public schools of this country. 141 If courts accept desegregation as a
compelling governmental interest, it becomes clear that a school district
will best meet this goal when it takes into account the race of the students
when making assignment and admissions decisions. It does not matter
the nature of the school program, whether it be for magnet schools,
research schools, charter schools, or a transfer plan; so long as officials
are seeking to institute programs which have as their goal the reduction
of racial isolation that comes from segregation, the official should be
permitted to consider race as part of their decision-making process. 142
As noted previously, the Supreme Court is most concerned about
illegitimate discrimination tactics disguised as legitimate admissions
programs. 143 This danger is not present when a local school board acts to
remedy clearly identifiable and obvious racial isolation in particular
school districts. In these instances, programs seek to implement the very

level of understanding of diverse points of view, and enhanced their desire to interact with people of
different backgrounds in the future .... [S]tudcnts report they have been strongly affected by their
school experiences.").
140. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705-07.
14 I. Brown, 349 U.S. at 300.
142. Similar reasoning was actually employed by the Supreme Court in McDaniel v. Barresi,
402 U.S. 39,41-42 (1971). A case that involved a school board that assigned students based on their
race. In that case, the Court held that this program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and stated that if the board had considered something other than the race of
the students it "would have severely hampered the board's ability to deal effectively with the task at
hand." !d. at 41.
143. Adarund, 515 U.S. at 224.
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concept that the Supreme Court itself set forth almost 50 years ago. 144
Therefore, courts should be less concerned with applying rigid factors
and more concerned with determining whether a given program 145 is a
good "fit" -and there is no better "fit" to achieve an integration of the
races in the primary and secondary school level than a program that
considers the race of the individual applicants. In addition, it is
important to remember that the Supreme Court stated that school
officials are to have broad power to formulate and implement
educational policies. 146
Where school officials have put together
programs that further desegregation, a long-standing and sound policy
established by the Supreme Court, and which seek to reduce racial
isolation in accordance with Supreme Court directive, the judiciary must
grant deference to their judgment.
V.

CONCLUSION

The use of race-based admissions in K-12 admissions programs is at
a critical stage. The circuit courts are divided on the constitutionality of
these programs, and lower courts are just now beginning to digest the
implications of the Supreme Court's recent University of Michigan
decisions. This will undoubtedly influence the continued use of racebased admissions at the K-12 level. The Supreme Court's judgment in
that case, and its analysis and use of the strict scrutiny standard there,
provide some guidance to courts at all levels as to the merits of racebased admissions standards in the educational context. However, until
the Supreme Court considers a K-12 race-based admissions program,
lower courts are left with the charge to correctly balance the higher
education cases with Brown and its progeny, all the while permitting
school officials to continue their task of desegregating America's public
schools.
Lower courts will likely hear many cases regarding K-12 race-based
admissions programs before the Supreme Court provides any clear
directive on the matter. As such, judiciaries that grapple with this issue
need to make a crucial determination as they review the various
programs. These courts must determine at the outset of their analysis
that the reduction of the racial isolation that results from de facto
segregation is a worthy governmental goal. Based on the Supreme

144.

Brown, 349 U.S. at 294.

145. This precise issue was described by the Supreme Court in Adarand and reiterated in
Cruller: admissions programs "must be calibrated to fit" the distinct issues raised in the use of race in
granting admissions in K-12 public schools. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
146. Swanrt, 402 U.S. at Iii.
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Court's directive concerning the end of racial segregation, and the recent
research indicating that segregation is once again occurring within the
public school system, there should be little doubt that the elimination of
this practice is a compelling interest that the government has a legitimate
right to address and remedy.
Once a court concludes that the
elimination of de facto segregation is a credible governmental goal, then
the court must exercise great care in determining how school district
personnel administer such a program. Moreover, careful consideration
should necessarily result in upholding programs that are not illegitimate
in their purpose; programs that seek to bring together those of different
racial and ethnic backgrounds, in full compliance with the directive of
the Supreme Court, should survive. If the courts do not permit these
programs to survive, it will be only a short time before segregation makes
an ugly, divisive, and permanent comeback in elementary and secondary
schools. 147

147. Perhaps we are already on our way back to segregation. Kevin Brown, The Implications of
the Equal Protection Clause for the Mandatory Integration of Public School Students, 29 Conn. L. Rev.
999 ( 1997). Professor Brown provides the following disturbing facts:
On December 13, 1993, the Harvard Project on School Desegregation released the results of a
study that shows that 66 percent of all Black students and 74.3 percent of all Hispanic students
attended predominantly minority schools in 1991-92. for African-Americans, these figures
represent the highest level of racial segregation since 1968. See William Celis, Ill, Study Finds Rising
Concentration of Black and Hispanic Students, N.Y. Times AI (Dec. 14, 1993). In 1986, only 63
percent of African-American students were attending predominately minority schools and in 1968,
only 54 percent of Latino students were attending majority-minority schools. !d. at n. 5.
Researchers at a recent conference in North Carolina gathered to address the issue of rescgregation
in public schools. See Alan Richard, Researchers: School Segregation Rising in the South, 22 Educ.
Week 5 (Sept. II, 2002) (available at <http:/ /www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug~02deseg.
h22&keywnrds~Alan%20Richard> (accessed Oct. 27, 2003 )).

